by Matthew Hinks
Litigating property rights cases in California requires navigating a confusing mélange of sometimes unfamiliar and often times conflicting groups of laws, rules and regulatory agencies.
On October 17, 2012, at the Marriott Los Angeles Downtown Hotel, I will be co-chairing an advanced one-day seminar entitled Litigating Property Rights and leading a distinguished panel of speakers who will help us understand this procedural and substantive thicket.
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By Matthew Hinks
The California Coastal Commission may not unilaterally impose a right of public access over private property. So says the California Court of Appeal in Bay Island Club v. California Coastal Commission.
Bay Island Club (the “Club”) is comprised of 24 shareholders and owners of single-family residences on Bay Island, a private island located in Newport Bay in the City of Newport Beach. It has held title to the island since the early 1900s. Balboa Peninsula lies adjacent to the island and was conveyed to the East Newport Town Company (“East Newport”) by the State of California in 1904. In 1927, East Newport granted to the Club an easement “to construct, maintain, repair and replace a bridge for pedestrian and/or automobile travel”. Subsequently, East Newport deeded fee title, subject to the Club’s easement, to certain real property, including the channel under the easement to the City.
The bridge built over the easement that existed at the time of the decision was constructed in 1958. In 2006, the Club applied to the California Coastal Commission for a permit to replace it with a 10-foot wide and 130-foot long bridge. Sometime prior to filing the application, the Club had erected a gate on the mainland side of the bridge preventing use of the bridge by the public. There was conflicting evidence in the record over when the gate was built, including evidence from members of the public that the gate was constructed after 1976, which, if true, meant that the gate was constructed in violation of the Coastal Act (passed in 1976), because it was built without a Coastal permit.
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By Matthew Hinks
Consider these facts: A married couple owns waterfront property in a picturesque harbor. They devoutly wish to build a pier or a dock on their property; however, the city refuses to even accept an application for a permit. This is because the city had previously passed and repeatedly extended an illegal moratorium preventing construction of new docks and piers in the area in which the couple’s property is located. The initial moratorium was passed on an emergency basis without a prior public hearing and without findings documenting the emergency or justifying expedited treatment. A state trial court declared that the rolling moratorium violated the state constitution. After the state appellate court granted a stay of the trial court’s decision, the city announced that it would continue to refuse permit applications for over-water structures during the pendency of the appeal and continued extending the moratorium until the city adopted a new comprehensive shoreline use plan that permanently banned new over-water construction and forever prevented the couple from building their dock.
Despite the earlier stay, the state court of appeal unanimously affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The state Supreme Court also affirmed holding that, not only is “[t]here is no authority in [applicable state law], express or inherent, [that] justifies the [c]ity’s attempt to impose unilateral moratoria”, state law affirmatively prohibits city-adopted moratorium in these circumstances. The state Supreme Court determined that the city’s actions amounted to a “clear violation of [the] property owners’ rights” and “resulted in a physical degradation of these private owners’ property”. Further, the city’s resort to the illegal moratoria was especially suspect being that, “the [c]ity had years to make any required plan changes but did not do so.”
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By Matthew Hinks
Sign litigation, especially litigation over the constitutionality of ordinances and regulations affecting signage, often involves familiar, but competing, concepts. Although the courts recognize that outdoor advertising signs are subject to certain protections as “commercial speech” under the First Amendment, municipalities and agencies nevertheless hold significant authority to regulate signage. So long as the regulations on signage are content neutral and further the recognized governmental interests in protecting traffic safety and eliminating visual blight, the regulations are generally upheld. However, where an ordinance or regulatory scheme affords local officials too much — or in the courts’ parlance, “unbridled” — discretion over whether to approve, deny or condition the approval of a sign, the courts are willing to step in and strike down the offending regulation. Although not a sign case, a new opinion out of the Ninth Circuit, Kaahumanu v. State of Hawaii, 2012 DJAR 7472 (9th Cir., June 6, 2012), offers a wonderful illustration of these competing principles.
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by Matthew Hinks
The California Legislature and the courts have recognized that challenges to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), if allowed to drag on, would impede the decisions of public agencies regarding land use. For this reason, CEQA imposes very short limitations periods and requires CEQA cases be given priority in both the trial courts and the courts of appeal.
But in a potentially troubling new case, the California Court of Appeal explicitly blessed the type of unreasonable litigation delay the Legislature protected against in enacting CEQA.
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By Matthew Hinks
May a property owner who sells property to a non-governmental entity as part of a government redevelopment project under the threat of eminent domain transfer the tax base of the original property to replacement property? Not on the record presented by the plaintiff in Duea v. County of San Diego, 204 Cal. App. 4th 691 (2012).
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By Matthew Hinks
A trial court’s order granting the motion of the City of Lake Forest for a preliminary injunction against the operations of a medical marijuana dispensary has gone — well — “up in smoke”. Orange County Superior Court Judge Chafee had ruled that the city’s zoning ordinances, which did not recognize dispensaries as a permitted use and expressly prohibited unpermitted uses, established a complete ban against medical marijuana dispensaries justifying preliminary injunctive relief. The Court of Appeal in City of Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holisitc Collective, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1413 (2012), disagreed and reversed that decision.
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By Matthew Hinks
In an earlier article on the California Land Use Blog, I wrote about the recent decision in Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente, 201 Cal.App.4th 1256 (2011), in which the court of appeal affirmed in large part a verdict in favor of a developer granting a writ of mandate and awarding damages as a result of a finding of a partial regulatory taking given what the court viewed as the “spot-zoning” of plaintiff’s property. I noted there that the trial court conducted its proceedings in two phases: the writ of mandate phase and the damages trial on the inverse condemnation claim. I also noted that the trial court issued the writ of mandate while the damages claim remained pending and before a final judgment was entered.
Though the Avenida San Juan Partnership court did not discuss this aspect of the case, I mentioned that trial courts are often reluctant to issue writs of mandate before a final judgment is entered. This can have a dramatic impact on a developer’s case against a local agency or city.
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By Matthew Hinks
In most instances, causes of action for inverse condemnation and regulatory takings in California are governed by the 5-year statute of limitations of Civil Procedure Code §§ 318 and 319. Preemption claims are governed by the 3-year statute of limitations of Civil Procedure Code § 338(a). Section 1983 claims in California state courts are governed by the 2-year personal injury statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1. However, according to the court in Aiuto v. City and County of San Francisco, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1347 (2011), where such claims are brought in connection with a facial challenge to a local ordinance or administrative action enacted or taken pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act, the 90-day statute of limitations of Government Code § 66499.37 applies.
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by Matthew Hinks
Court judgments finding a regulatory taking are relatively rare. So too are decisions upholding the oft-heard complaint of “spot zoning”. In the recent case of Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente, 201 Cal.App.4th 1256 (2011), the court (and the plaintiff) hit the daily double.
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California Land Use Blog